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During the last 15 years, the social capital literature has grown rapidly. In particular 
after Robert Putnam’s (1993) study of regional governments in Italy, the interest among 
economists and politologists exploded as Putnam showed that the concept could be used 
in quantitative explanations of a series of social and economic phenomena. The early 
literature was unavoidably indiscriminate as to distinguishing between the various 
elements of social capital, but more recent literature has stressed the need to distinguish 
between the constituent elements of Putnam’s social capital concept, in particular 
emphasizing the role of social trust. This is in turn defined as the confidence people 
have that strangers, i.e. fellow citizens on whom they have no specific information, will 
not take advantage of them (Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2006). Using the answers to the 
World Values Survey question “In general, do you think that most people can be 
trusted?”, the by now quite substantial literature has found that social trust is associated 
with a set of different macroeconomic outcomes: economic growth, the rule of law and 
overall quality of governance, corruption, education, the extent of violent crime and 
subjective well-being are all influenced by the propensity of people within any nation to 
trust each other.
1 
The questions are therefore where trust comes from and whether or not it can be 
affected by public policy. The answers to these questions seem to divide researchers 
into two camps: the optimists and the pessimists. The former group may be best 
represented by Knack and Zak (2002) who estimate the effects of education and the rule 
of law alongside a set of factors that cannot be influenced in the short to medium run. 
The pessimist group, on the other hand, does not find much of a role for policy as they 
argue that the empirical associations between social trust and e.g. education or rule of 
law reflect the reverse causal direction, i.e. that trust has caused part of the cross-
country differences in these factors. The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of a 
number of the central factors proposed in the literature and sort out which of those 
factors are associated with social trust. Although it to some extent rests on earlier work 
in Uslaner (2002) and Bjørnskov (2005), the paper differs from earlier studies in using a 
much larger sample of countries and including extra factors. It moreover distinguishes 
between factors affecting individuals’ trust radii and social distance, respectively, and 
explores indirect effects. 
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  1The rest of paper is structured as follows. First, the next section discusses the 
theoretical impacts of a number of factors suggested in previous literature; a second 
section reviews this literature after which a data description follows. The data are used 
in the following section that provides empirical estimates of the determinants of social 
trust. The fourth section explores the determinants of two types of fractionalization 
before summarizing and drawing policy implications. 
 
THEORY 
Tracing the trust differences across Italian regions back to the early renaissance, 
Putnam’s (1993) original study suggests that such features have very deep historical 
roots. Jackman and Miller (1998), on the other hand, provide a much more optimistic 
view on the potential for influencing trust in the shorter run through public policy. As 
such, the discipline is divided into two strands. Where the first strand tends to see trust 
as a cultural or moral feature, the second interprets trust as reputation, which arises from 
conscious and purely self-interested motives endogenously determined with institutions 
and policies shaping the incentives to trust. Guinnane (2005), relying on the latter line 
of thinking, even comes to the conclusion that trust is “a concept too many” in the social 
sciences because the effects of trust are already perfectly captured by standard theories 
of reputation that need no moral or sociological foundations. He concludes that “the 
importance of information and enforcement, which is the core of the useful notion of 
trust, has been recognized in economics for decades. Giving it another name […] will 
not accomplish anything”. However, at the crux of his thinking, as is the case for most 
of the literature arguing that trust can easily be created, is the assumption that social 
trust is simply a reputation effect arising from repeated face-to-face interactions. 
Following this assumption to its logical conclusion would imply that there is nothing 
social about social trust other than in a rather local sense. Yet, such trust-creating 
mechanisms are refuted by individual-level analyses in Claibourn and Martin (2000) 
and Uslaner (2002), and in cross-country analysis in Bjørnskov (2006). Instead, Uslaner 
(2002) suggests that social trust – what he refers to as ‘moral trust’ - is the trust that we 
place in people on whom we have no specific information and whose reputation we 
consequently know nothing about. What arises in face-to-face interactions is instead 
termed particularized or strategic trust, as it is based on specific information on those 
whom one interact with. In this line of thinking, social trust is therefore the ‘reputation’ 
of most people, i.e. an ex ante belief of how likely any randomly selected individual is 
to behave in an honest and trustworthy manner. 
In order to conceptualize the way in which different factors affect the creation and 
destruction of social trust as opposed to simple personal reputation, I rely on 
Fukuyama’s (1995) concept of “trust radius”. His theoretical starting point is that people 
tend to trust those who are reasonably similar to themselves. In Uslaner’s (2002) 
terminology, individuals situated within the trust radius of any person are those who 
belong to his or her “moral community”. But, as Uslaner (2002, 181) stresses, “the rich 
and the poor have little reason to believe that they share common values, and thus might 
well be wary of each others’ motives”. When people evaluate the actions of other 
individuals who are similar to themselves, they can relatively easily understand the 
background, situation and motives of the actions while the chances for misinterpretation 
and suspicion towards the motives are much more pronounced when people have to 
evaluate the actions of those who do not share their status, position in society, ethnicity 
or general weltanschauung. In the latter case, people will therefore often rationally tend 
  2to place less trust in the benevolence of other people, which could lead to a lower 
general level of social trust in fractionalized societies. 
As such, individuals at each ends of the income distribution will likely feel that 
they have very little in common and thus feel no or very little responsibility towards 
people whom they perceive to be substantially different from them. In other words, even 
if individuals’ trust radii are wide – their moral communities are relatively diverse – a 
high degree of social fractionalization arising from e.g. income dispersion, and ethnic, 
lingual, religious or political diversity may make people within the same community or 
nation appear less similar. This dilemma is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Fractionalization and trust radii 
 
 
Position in society 
0  ½ 1 
Trust radius 
Position in society 
0  ½ 1 
The two lines depict two societies, one with a high degree of social fractionalization as 
illustrated by the long line – there are large differences between e.g. the rich and the 
poor – and one with a short line and hence little fractionalization. The average 
individual in both societies have the same trust radius, represented by the ellipses. Yet 
in the highly fractionalized society the trust radius of an average person only extends to 
a quarter of the population while in the less fractionalized society the trust radius 
extends to half of the population. By splitting the factors influencing trust into two 
groups – those that are likely to influence the degree of social fractionalization and the 
external and internal factors that influence individuals’ trust radii – it is therefore 
possible to relatively easily conceptualize what can be done and how trust creation can 
be influenced at the macro level. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although this distinction is not made in the literature, the following reviews existing 
studies with it mind. Hence, it consists of three subsections outlining previous findings 
of the effects of fractionalization, factors affecting trust radii, and policy variables. 
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Turning to the empirical literature on the determinants of social trust, there is virtually 
complete consensus that the most important determinants of trust are measures of 
fractionalization that also capture effects of social distance (Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Zak and Knack, 2001; Knack and Zak, 2002; Uslaner, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2005).
2 
Fractionalization is typically measured along two dimensions: income inequality, and 
ethnic or ethnolinguistic diversity. In the following, I shall introduce a third dimension, 
political diversity, which along the lines of the argument above might have similar 
effects as the other measures of fractionalization.
3  
Income inequality is easily observable in most societies and as such a strong 
indicator of social fractionalization, which could lead to lower trust. However, the 
effects of income inequality could also be due to perceived injustices arising from 
perceptions of why some people are rich and others are not. To ‘have’ might – in 
particular when interpreted within traditional leftwing understandings of society - be 
interpreted as an outcome of having exploited those who ‘have not’, which will tend to 
reinforce stereotypes of other groups in society and thereby perpetuate mistrust between 
those groups (Boix and Posner, 1998). As such, the effects of inequality might be due to 
both the factual fractionalization as well as individuals’ perceptions of fractionalization. 
To the extent that the latter is the stronger explanation, the distinction also entails rather 
different policy implications than given by the existing trust literature since a way to 
increase social trust would be to inform about the ‘true’ mechanisms behind the existing 
fractionalization instead of simply ‘fighting the numbers’.  
While the existing literature has focused on objective measures, perceptions may 
be equally crucial to understanding the potential effects of other types of 
fractionalization as it for example must be realized that ethnic diversity is a latent 
variable and that political diversity is a type of fractionalization that can only be very 
noisily observed or inferred from behaviour and clothing. Under some circumstances, or 
maybe due to freak coincidences, can ethnic diversity lead to conflict or distrust while 
other circumstances may not trigger any conflict. One of these circumstances could be 
the perception of ethnicity while other circumstances could pertain to the integration of 
ethnic minorities into society. Moreover, any effect from political diversity must 
logically stem from either a perception (or misperception) of how one’s political 
adversaries view the world and act within it or a fundamental aversion of accepting that 
view. 
A final note of caution applies to the data on income inequality. Henderson et al. 
(2005) argue that although income inequality might seem very low in communist 
societies, the degree of consumption inequality is quite considerable. The point is that 
people do not pay cash for access to special stores, cars or datjas, but are given these 
things as rewards for proving loyal and useful to the communist party. These 
deficiencies of communist statistics may have made the inevitable increase in inequality 
following the demise of the communist systems in the Soviet bloc seem larger than they 
were in reality and thus to a severe underestimation of real inequality in these countries. 
 
                                                 
2 Likewise, studies in experimental economics have shown the effects of social distance on behaviour in 
various trust games (Hoffman et al., 1996; Glaeser et al., 2000; Buchan and Croson, 2004). 
3 It should be noted that there are similar indices of religious and linguistic diversity that are correlated 
with ethnic diversity. However, as is the case in the rest of the literature, I find that ethnic diversity has 
the strongest effects throughout. I therefore refrain from discussing the other types. 
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Following the conceptual distinction in the above, a number of factors have been argued 
to affect individuals’ trust radii. Some of the factors proposed in earlier studies can be 
easily changed while others are very persistent over time. Given the stability of trust 
over the two decades covered by the WVS, it could a priori be assumed that most 
determinants have deep historical roots, a suggestion first put forward by Putnam, 
(1993) and substantiated by recent studies. Uslaner (2004c) for example shows that 
Americans’ propensity to trust depends strongly on the current trust level in the home 
country of their ancestors, indicating a substantial time-invariant cultural element that 
must necessarily be transmitted within the family. Interestingly, the only exceptions are 
people of Eastern European descent that are substantially more trusting than people 
living in these countries today. Most studies indeed find that postcommunist countries 
are less trusting, despite their more equal income distributions, due to the detrimental 
effects of communist surveillance and control. Winston Churchill, who was always up 
for a memorable quote, for example once called communism “a horrible form of mental 
and moral disease” (quoted in Addison, 2005, 93). Paldam and Svendsen’s (2000) 
dictatorship theory also stresses the detrimental moral effects of communism, as most of 
these countries took meticulous care to ensure that virtually everyone might be spying 
for a secret service. The East German Stasi (das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit), for 
example, employed 91,000 full time employees and an estimated 300,000 private 
informants at the time of the communist collapse, implying that about 4% of the adult 
population actively worked for the organization. For most people in the communist 
bloc, there were therefore quite strong incentives not to trust people whom they did not 
know personally, which substantially narrowed their trust radius. 
Religion comprises another set of factors that most studies find are important to 
social trust (la Porta et al., 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001; Uslaner, 2002; Berggren and 
Jordahl, in press). Most find that countries with a large share of Protestants are more 
trusting although different explanations have been proposed. Some studies stress that 
Protestantism is a non-hierarchical religion, as opposed to Catholicism and Islam. In 
Protestantism, as in most Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism, the 
responsibility of ones actions is individualized such that actions that are morally 
‘wrong’ will somehow be penalized in the afterlife. On the other hand, in Catholicism it 
is possible to be absolved of ones sins by the church. The practice of absolution thus 
releases the subjects of the Pope of individual responsibility for their worst deeds, 
which could lead people to be more wary of trusting their fellow citizens. Another joint 
problem for hierarchical religions may be a potential built-in tendency for individuals to 
place part of the responsibility for their actions on a supreme power. Many Muslims for 
example use the phrase “Inch’Allah” in their daily life, suggesting that a variety of 
things only occur ‘if God will’, which means that only contingent on a number of 
factors do people feel morally obliged to keep their promises. This God-given 
uncertainty naturally could lead to a lower trust in fellow citizens. Another possible 
effect of hierarchies, not only religious, is that people come to live according to strict 
rules. They may therefore fail to develop trust because following rules does not induce 
any social learning about what people would do in the absence of any enforced formal 
rules.
4 However, an alternative possibility is that part of the effect of Islam arises due to 
the Arab-Muslim tradition for totalitarian systems, which may have suppressed trust in 
                                                 
4 As far as I know, this argument is new to the social capital literature. I am grateful to Niclas Berggren 
for suggesting it to me. 
  5much the same way as communism did.
5 Regardless of the explanations most studies 
find that countries with large Protestant and Eastern-religious populations are more 
trusting while those with large Catholic and Muslim populations are less trusting, both 
types of explanations relying on effects influencing individuals’ trust radius. 
Finally, I have in previous work found that monarchies have significantly more 
trusting populations (Bjørnskov, 2005), although it should be stressed that it cannot be 
ascertained a priori whether this is an effect of monarchs setting an example of good 
behaviour by, as the British and Danish monarchs for example traditionally do at the 
close of the year, reprimanding the population for slips of morality, or if the effects of 
monarchy instead capture historical factors that simultaneously affect trust and has 
perpetuated this particular political institution. As such, it is uncertain how to categorize 
the effects of monarchy as the latter explanation would imply an effect on individuals’ 
trust radius while the former would most likely be an effect of monarchs reducing the 
perceived social fractionalization by being a symbol of unity common to all society. 
 
Policy variables 
Turning to the set of policy variables that might potentially affect social trust, 
institutional quality in one form or another is often mentioned. As such, Zak and Knack 
(2001) and Berggren and Jordahl (in press) both argue that the rule of law affects trust 
creation as it, in the terminology of this paper, increases individuals’ trust radii by 
reducing the prospective costs of having one’s trust misused. The latter argues broader 
that individuals need to be “free to trust” as they also find indications that other 
elements of economic freedom are associated with social trust, i.e. that the institutions 
of market economy entail civilizing mechanisms and incentives that stimulate trust (e.g. 
Hirschman, 1982). Both economic freedom and democracy might also reduce the 
degree of perceived fractionalization in society as all would be allowed to participate in 
the political process regardless of their status in society (Berggren, 1999). 
A number of studies have also argued that political trust is beneficial for the 
creation of social trust as politicians provide role models for ordinary citizens who will 
tend to increase their trust radii whenever politicians appear to be trustworthy 
(Yamagish and Yamagishi, 1994; Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Rothstein, 2003). Likewise, 
education has been argued to lead to higher social trust, based on the arguments that 
more educated individuals will be in a better position to evaluate risks and potential, 
thereby reducing the uncertainty of dealing with strangers (Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
Knack and Zak, 2002). The risk reduction would in virtually all models of behaviour 
lead to a higher propensity to trust people on whom one has only limited information. 
Along similar lines, education might either socialize individuals or ‘indoctrinate’ them 
with a moral belief that one should always trust other people. Following these lines of 
thought, education would hence increase individuals’ trust radii. Some of the same 
considerations would apply to freedom of press, as free and dependable information 
could be argued to be necessary for individuals to form accurate beliefs about their 
fellow citizens. 
Finally, Torpe (2003) and Kumlin and Rothstein (2005) argue that the ‘welfare 
state’ produces trust, in particular when those states do not test whether citizens 
                                                 
5 See for example Bernard Lewis (2002), a book entitled “What Went Wrong” that describes the decline 
of the Arab world relative to Europe. It is worth noting that Indonesia, which is the world’s largest 
Muslim country, has a rather high social trust score and – being Asian - no Arab background. Voigt 
(2005) focuses instead on problems associated with Arab or Muslim norms. 
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welfare state makes people’s lives more certain by e.g. protecting them from severe 
income losses due to unemployment and by redistributing substantial sums from the 
rich to the poor, thereby quasi-artificially making the income distribution more even. 
These effects would likely both reduce social fractionalization and perhaps increase 
individuals’ trust radius, as people might perceive the income distribution to be fairer. 
However, it is an open question if the majority of the population in such states would 
perceive the intensive redistribution as ‘fair’ since most citizens would pay high taxes to 
finance the welfare state. Welfare state institutions thus risk creating more social 
fractionalization, in particular if those institutions would prevent certain groups in 
society from being integrated in e.g. the labour market. A priori, the total effect of 
welfare systems is not certain. This and other questions are sought answered using the 
data outlined in the following.  
 
DATA 
I measure social trust in what has become the standard way, by taking the percentage of 
a population that answers yes to the WVS question “In general, do you think that most 
people can be trusted?” (Inglehart et al., 2004). Although the use of survey data in 
economics and measures of social capital in particular have been criticized for the 
shortcoming that it is not always clear what the data measure (e.g. Durlauf, 2002), this 
variable has proved to be a reliable and valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, for 
example by being strongly correlated with return rates in a wallet-drop experiment 
(Knack, 2001; Uslaner, 2002). The optimist strand of the literature would indicate that 
social trust reacts to a number of outward stimuli, which would make the time of 
observation crucial. However, the trust scores in the WVS are very stable over time 
(Uslaner, 2002; Volken, 2002; Bjørnskov, 2005). I therefore use the average of all 
available observations, supplemented by data from the 1995 Latinobarometro and the 
2003-2004 Danish Social Capital project. This probably smoothes out some of the 
inevitable noise, and gives a total of 88 observations listed in the appendix. Table 1 
gives descriptive statistics on all variables. It should be noted that while the paper thus 
uses a substantially larger sample than previous literature, the averages of trust and 
other variables are quite close to those in earlier studies. The differences in results are 
therefore not likely to arise from a shift in the balance between countries but only due to 
more precise cross-country information. 
Turning to the data used to capture fractionalization in the following, income 
inequality is measured as is standard by the Gini coefficient, taken from the Deininger 
and Squire (1996) database. To capture ethnic diversity, I use data from Alesina et al. 
(2003) measuring the probability of two randomly selected citizens of a country being 
of different ethnic background. As a measure of the third dimension of fractionalization 
– political diversity – I calculate the variance of the national answers of the WVS 
question on where people would place themselves on a scale from 1 (extreme left) to 10 
(extreme right). Since this question is not included in the Latinobarometro or the Danish 
Social Capital Project, the sample size is somewhat reduced whenever using political 
diversity. Religion is measured as the share of the population that belongs to a Muslim, 
Protestant, Catholic, or Eastern (Buddhist, Hindu) denomination. These data derive 
from CIA (2004) supplemented by USDS (2004). I also use dummies for 
postcommunist countries, monarchies, and the Nordic countries as a control for specific 
Scandinavian features as, for example, remnants of Viking norms. 
  7Political competition is measured as the ten-year average Herfindahl index of the 
legislature, such that a higher score means less political competition. The data to 
calculate these scores derive from Beck et al. (2001). Political trust is measured by the 
variable ‘confidence in parliament’, which derives from the WVS, and is the average 
national score on the question of how much confidence respondents have in parliament 
and thus in the political system. The answers are on a scale from 1 (no confidence) to 4 
(full confidence), hence low scores mean a high degree of confidence. These data are 
supplemented by the scores of a similar question in the Danish Social Capital project. 
Next, the policy variables derive from three different sources. Education is 
measured by the net enrolment in secondary school in 2000, taken from World Bank 
(2004). Rule of law, which measures the strength of the legal system, derives from the 
Kaufmann et al. (2003) dataset while democracy is measured in the standard way as the 
Gastil index in 2002. This variable, which is distributed between 1 (full political rights) 
to 7 (no political rights) derives from Freedom House (2003). A more recent publication 
from the same source (Freedom House, 2004) provides the data on press freedom, 
distributed from 1 (perfect freedom) to 100 (no freedom). Finally, welfare state effects 
are measured by two different indicators, overall government spending and the 
generosity of benefits. Government expenditure is measured as the ten-year average of 
government expenditure final consumption (World Bank, 2004) while the variable 
‘workers’ remittances’ is a measure of unemployment protection and the generosity of 
unemployment benefits. It is calculated by dividing the ten-year average of workers’ 
remittances and compensation of employees taken from World Bank (2004) by total 
GDP. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean  Standard  deviation  Observations 
Catholics 33.03  39.18  90 
Democracy 2.47  1.72  88 
Eastern religions  4.53  18.50  90 
Ethnic diversity  .36  .23  88 
Government expenditure  15.76  5.54  86 
Income inequality  39.19  10.58  82 
Log GDP per capita  8.93  .99  89 
Monarchy .16  .37  91 
Muslims 8.97  22.06  90 
Openness   80.69  54.38  87 
Political competition  .71  .23  86 
Political diversity  5.13  1.89  77 
Political ideology  .06  .54  89 
Postcommunist .25  .44  91 
Price distortion  1.52  .73  88 
Protestants 15.53  27.08  90 
Rule of law  .35  1.04  89 
Secondary schooling  81.74  28.74  84 
Social trust  26.99  13.14  88 
Workers’ remittances  2.97  4.76  83 
 
Finally, a set of additional variables is used in a further section that explores the 
heterogeneity of parameter estimates and the potential indirect effects. The log to the 
size of the population derives from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2002), which 
is also used to calculate the variable termed ‘price distortion - the ratio of the investment 
price level to the general price level – and the ten-year rate of trade volume to GDP, 
  8termed ‘openness’. Finally, ‘political ideology’ is based on the database in Beck et al. 
(2001) and calculated as the ten-year average of the ideology of the parties in 
government, weighted by their share of seats in parliament and based on a 
categorization of parties into leftwing (given the score -1), centre parties (0) and 
rightwing parties (1). These data go into the regressions presented in the following. 
 
DIRECT DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL TRUST 
I now turn to estimating the determinants of social trust. Throughout this section, I rely 
on simple OLS supplemented by a robust regression technique;
6 readers interested in 
formal causality tests are referred to Uslaner (2002) and Bjørnskov (2005), both of 
which employ instrumental variables techniques to sort out the causal directions. The 
exceptions are a set of new variables not tested in previous studies for which separate 
instrumental variables estimates are referred to in footnotes. All instrumental variables 
are, as far as possible, chosen on the basis of existing studies under the condition that 
they pass standard tests of exogeneity. As such, all sets of instruments reported in the 
following pass Sargan tests for overidentification. 
To provide a first look, Figure 2 provides a histogram suggesting the effects of a 
set of variables that previous research in Uslaner (2002) and Bjørnskov (2005) has 
found to be important and robust determinants. From the difference between the first 
two columns, one can grasp the importance of income inequality, as the left-hand 
column – countries with a below-average level of inequality – is much higher and hence 
countries with relatively equal income distributions a priori seem to be more trusting. In 
the second set of columns, it is easy to see that monarchies seem to have substantially 
more trusting populations, while the following columns also support that ethnically 
diverse (Diversity) and postcommunist countries are less trusting, and populations 
predominantly belonging to non-hierarchical religions are more trusting.
7 These 
differences are highly significant with the odd exception of having a communist past, 
which is only significant at p<.12. Which of these differences are real and which of the 




The estimates are presented in Tables 2 and 3, where the former presents the baseline 
specification and the potential effects of culture and fractionalization and the latter 
presents the results of including policy variables. The estimates are obtained without 
regional effects for which no support was found.
8 Before proceeding to the results, 
column 1 in Table 2 first of all tackles the problem of untrustworthy trust observations. 
                                                 
6 Robust regression techniques work by running OLS regressions iteratively and reweighting the 
observations based on their residuals after each iteration until the process converges. These techniques 
therefore have a much higher breaking point than ordinary regressions. 
7 Hierarchical religions are Orthodox and Catholic Christianity and Islam while non-hierarchical religions 
include Hinduism, Buddhism, and Protestant Christianity, the latter mostly consisting of Lutherans and 
Anglicans. It should be stressed that although I do not in any way attempt to correct for this, there is some 
reasons to believe that the North American arm of the Catholic Church, having to compete with a vast 
number of other churches and religions, is less hierarchical than the Roman church in the rest of the 
world. 
8 A test for the joint significance of dummies for Asia, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East 
and South-Saharan Africa in the baseline specification showed that regional effects do not have any 
explanatory power and as such should be left out of the specification (F=.857; p<.74). 
  9Uslaner (2002) chooses to exclude China from all samples as the trust score is on level 
with the Scandinavian countries and is a clear outlier in most analyses; in Bjørnskov 
(2005) I note the same worry with respect to the Iranian trust score available from the 
most recent wave of the WVS. In column 1 of Table 2, it is evident that these two 
observations should be excluded as they seem to be more than two standard deviations 
larger than would be expected from the baseline specification.
9 In all the following 
analyses, I therefore exclude both Iran and China. 
 






























Focusing on the rest of the table and comparing across columns, it is first of all obvious 
that fractionalization in the form of income inequality is the strongest explanatory 
factor, as suggested by most previous studies. The coefficient is significant at p<.01 and 
only fails this level once in Table 3. There is thus again very strong support for the 
notion that social fractionalization is detrimental to the creation of social trust. It should, 
however, be noted that estimates in Bjørnskov (2005), relying on IV estimates, indicate 
that there may be a feedback effect due to trusting populations being more supportive of 
redistributive policies. As such, the effects of income inequality may be slightly 
underestimated due to the potential downwards bias arising from the feedback. On the 
other hand, ethnic diversity is in general not significant although it remains of roughly 
the same size and sign in both Table 2 and 3 with the exception of column 4, which 
includes political diversity and uses a somewhat smaller sample of countries. The 
coefficient is again significant in the robust regression with the full sample in column 6 
while it fails significance in column 7. However, as stressed above ethnic diversity 
probably captures a latent conflict, which might only be realized under certain 
                                                 
9 With respect to China, it is interesting to note that Hong Kong, which shares central cultural 
characteristics with communist China scores 27% on the trust index. The difference between the official 
Chinese average score of 55% minus the effect of the China/Iran dummy quite precisely corresponds to 
that plus the estimated effect of having a communist past. One should of course not put too much faith in 
this simple result, yet other analyses point in the same direction. Relying on the rather large residual of 
China in cross-country regressions with corruption, governance, legal quality or education as the 
dependent variable, a ‘true’ Chinese trust score of about 20% also seems a reliable guess. 
  10conditions. The concluding section therefore returns to this problem. Conversely, the 
effects of political diversity – the third fractionalization variable – are highly significant 
and of the expected negative sign. As a final measure of fractionalization, column 5 
includes a Herfindahl index, which is significant at p<.10, indicating that political 
competition is detrimental to social trust. However, when instrumenting this variable, it 
becomes insignificant and even changes sign.
10 The correlation therefore more likely 
reflects either the reverse causality or a spurious relation. 
Proceeding to the factors that a priori could be associated with individuals’ trust 
radii and turning firstly to the effects of having a communist past, the tables again 
replicate the results of previous studies as the coefficient is negative throughout. Hence, 
while communist countries reduced social fractionalization they to an even larger extent 
reduced their citizens’ trust radii, resulting in an overall loss of social trust. The 
coefficient nevertheless fails to be significant in a number of cases including the robust 
regressions. As I suggest in Bjørnskov (2005), there are rather varied responses to the 
postcommunist transition in Central and Eastern Europe, a potential reason for this 
difference from previous studies that have tended to use trust data from earlier waves of 
the WVS is that some of these countries are recovering from the detrimental effects of 
communism. Although one should be careful to conclude anything, this result might 
give some reason to be optimistic on behalf of postcommunist societies. 
Another historical effect is that of having a monarchy, which is highly significant 
throughout the table, indicating that the populations in monarchies are approximately 
nine percentage points more trusting than in comparable republics. As stressed above, 
this could be evidence of a demonstration effect of the monarchs and their families that 
could provide role models for society or it could be evidence of an unknown factor that 
affects both trust and the survival of the institution of monarchy. As a simple first test 
for this difference, it could be expected that countries that have been monarchies in 
historical times also contain traces of the latter features.
11 This effect, were it there, 
would have to show up as systematic variation associated with former monarchies. 
However, there is no evidence to suggest that these countries have different trust levels, 
all other things being equal (not shown). Even though this question should be left to 
future research, the most likely explanation therefore seems to be that monarchies 




                                                 
10 The instrumental variables rule of law, and dummies for postcommunism, bicameralism and common 
law are not overly strong in the first stage regression (F=6.34; pseudo R square=.140) but nonetheless 
produce a coefficient of -5.270 (standard error 10.715), i.e. even relatively weak instrumentation makes 
the coefficient change sign. On the other hand, the instrumented estimate of political diversity, using 
regional dummies and the log to GDP per capita as instruments (F=16.99; pseudo R square=.656) 
produces a coefficient of -3.456, (standard error 1.081), which is slightly larger than the OLS estimate. 
However, although this might indicate a two-way causality social trust nevertheless turns out to be 
insignificant in regressions explaining political diversity. 
11 These countries include France (which disposed of the monarchy in 1789), Portugal (1910), Russia 
(1917), Austria and Hungary that formed the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1918), Bulgaria (1946), Italy 
(1946), and Greece (1967). Finland, having been part of Sweden until 1809 and an autonomous part of 
Russia until 1917, and Iceland, which was part of Denmark until 1944, also fall into this category. 
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Table 2. Determinants of social trust – culture and fractionalization   
Estimation method  OLS  Robust 
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Protestants .129**  .126** 











Muslims -.111**  -.116*** 











Catholics -.035  -.037 

























Monarchy 9.632***  9.456*** 







































Political  competition 9.106*
(4.932) 
China and Iran  -36.199*** 
(7.104) 
Observations 83 81 81 66 79 81 66
Pseudo R squared  
 
.570  .534  .568  .677  .585  -  - 
F-statistic 17.25             
               
17.75 29.97 26.62 29.33 13.99 12.84
RMSE 9.455 9.317 8.972 8.054 8.903 - -
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. 
  12Most previous studies have also found significant effects of religion, yet before turning 
to these effects a word of caution is necessary when interpreting the estimates across 
columns. Most people in most of the countries in the sample belong to a religious 
denomination, making the control group consisting of non-religious people, Jews and 
people belonging to indigenous beliefs rather small while the bulk of the potential 
effects of Orthodox Christianity are picked up by the postcommunism dummy. The 
estimated differences between Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam and Eastern religions 
(Buddhism, Hinduism) should therefore be interpreted relative to each other rather than 
as absolute effects. The results show that Muslim countries are less trusting than 
comparable countries while the negative effects of Catholicism are not significant and 
the positive effects of Protestantism and Eastern religions are positive, as suggested by 
previous studies. 
However, if a dummy for the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden) is entered, Protestantism looses its significance while the dummy 
becomes significant at p<.05, indicating that these countries are on average 16 
percentage points more trusting, all other things being equal. Whether this exercise is 
informative or not is not a priori clear as these countries are the only ones in the sample 
except the United Kingdom in which the bulk of the population is Protestant. Yet, 
judging from the coefficient on Protestants in column 2, the Nordic countries where an 
average of 90% of the populations belongs to a Protestant denomination would only be 
11 percentage points more trusting than comparable countries. Furthermore, if the 
Nordic countries are excluded from the sample (not shown) the Protestant effect entirely 
disappears while leaving the remaining coefficient virtually unchanged. It must 
therefore be acknowledged that the effect of Protestantism may not be of religion per se, 
but could cover an effect of much deeper historical factors such as social mobility in 
medieval times or remnants of Viking norms of honesty. For example, the Nordic 
languages still use the Viking saying “a word is a word”, sometimes followed by “and a 
man is a man”, indicating that if a man was to break his word he would no longer 
qualify to be treated as such.
12 
Other support for this being a Nordic effect and not an effect of Protestantism 
derive from regional comparisons, two of which are particularly indicative. Splitting the 
1999 WVS responses from Western Germany into regions, there are no visible 
differences between Catholic and Protestant Bünder, as the regional average trust scores 
are fairly similar. The exception is the northern-most region of Schleswig-Holstein in 
which approximately half of the population states that most people can be trusted 
compared to the total German average of 36%. While the inhabitants of Schleswig are 
no more Protestant than the rest of Germany, it is worth considering that the region 
belonged to the Kingdom of Denmark until the second war of Schleswig in 1864 and 
was one of the centres of Viking trading activity.
13 The second indicative regional 
comparison is between England and Scotland, where Catholicism is substantially 
stronger than in the rest of the United Kingdom. While, for example, members of the 
                                                 
12 It is worth noting that the Nordic sagas are full of examples of what might happen to men who did not 
hold their word. The Nordic reputation for honesty is even so widely known in neighbouring countries 
that the German comedian Otto Waalkes wrote a (very funny) song a few years ago entitled “Dänen lügen 
nicht” (Danes don’t lie). 
13 The Northern half returned to Denmark after a plebiscite following World War I and is now known as 
Sønderjylland while the southern half and all of Holstein continues to belong to Germany. The division 
has left large minorities on both sides of the border that, contrary to the situation in almost all other 
border regions in the world, are well integrated and have never constituted a social or political problem. 
  13Anglican Church outnumber Catholics by a factor 6.3 in England, the same number is 
only 2.6 in Scotland, relying on the most recent census data. Yet, the 83 Scotsmen 
answering the trust question in the 1999 wave of the WVS seemingly had a much higher 
propensity to trust than the average Brit.
14 Although it would be rash to rely on averages 
based on so few observations, it is quite contrary to what could be expected had 
Protestantism exerted a positive influence. The examples as well as the empirical 
evidence therefore cast doubt on whether the effects of Protestantism found by previous 
studies are really effects of religion. Further care is warranted by the robust regressions 
in columns 6 and 7, which show a significant Protestant effect in the full sample but not 
in the reduced sample. 
Turning to the effects of policy variables presented in Table 3 supports the 
pessimistic view of the potential for public policy to influence the creation of social 
trust. In column 1, education is entered showing that it is not significantly associated 
with social trust. This clearly is contrary to e.g. the cross-country estimates in Knack 
and Zak (2002) and individual-level estimates in Uslaner (2002) while being consistent 
with the evidence in Bjørnskov (2005). The rule of law, democracy and press freedom 
neither exert any significant influences although all are of the expected sign. The 
absence of an effect could be due to either reverse causality or a bias in the OLS 
estimates induced by bidirectional causality. Yet, while the present paper does not 
present instrumented estimates, it is worth considering a simple argument. Most 
countries in the world have experienced improvements in the rule of law and education 
during the last few decades. Had social trust been an effect of such factors, one should 
expect that trust levels had increased during that period. Yet, the trust levels across 
countries have stayed remarkably stable (Uslaner, 2002; Volken, 2002; Bjørnskov, 
2005). For this to have been the case, the proponents of a causal direction going from 
e.g. rule of law to trust must furthermore assume some unknown global force working 
against social trust with a stronger impact in countries that have improved their legal 
systems the most. As the instrumented estimates in Berggren and Jordahl (in press) and 
Bjørnskov (2005) point in opposite causal directions, it seems most safe to conclude 
that there probably is an effect of trust on the rule of law and maybe also an influence in 
the opposite direction picked up by the choice of historically determined instruments in 
the former study. Yet, it is worth stressing that what the relation between social trust 
and the quality of formal institutions looks like in the very long run are not ascertainable 
in such types of analysis. 
When turning to the conjectures in Rothstein (2003) and Torpe (2003) that 
countries with a high degree of confidence in politicians and the political system are 
more likely to trust their fellow citizens, the coefficient is again of the expected sign but 
far from being significant. The non-significance could naturally be due to OLS 




                                                 
14 The British average in the 1999 survey was 30% while 41 of the 83 Scottish respondents (49%) stated 
that most people can be trusted. Although the number of respondents is very small, this result is replicated 
in the 1998 British Social Attitudes survey (Casey, 2004). 
15 An instrumented estimate yields a coefficient of -.114 (standard error 6.229) with a set of instrumental 
variables consisting of the log to GDP per capita, the log to population size and regional dummies 
(F=12.07; pseudo R square=.439), indicating that any association between the two variables reflects that 
trusting populations are also more likely to trust their politicians and the political system. 
  14 
Table 3. Determinants of social trust - policy variables 
              1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Muslims -.134***  -.107** 







































Monarchy 7.870**  9.156*** 









































  15Table 3 continued 
 
Secondary schooling  .069 
(.059) 
         
       
             
    
  
             
               




Press freedom        .004 
(.063) 
Government expenditure          -.326 
(.262) 
Confidence in parliament            -3.264 
(3.690) 
 
Workers’  remittances -.242
(.188) 
Observations 78 81 81 80 80 73 75
Pseudo R squared  
 
.577  .563  .565  .561  .568  .589  .562 
F-statistic 27.25             
               
26.85 27.33 26.52 26.75 24.28 27.01
RMSE 9.011 9.018 9.007 9.101 8.992 9.142 9.013
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. 
 
  16Lastly, turning to the effects of welfare states proposed by e.g. Rothstein (2003) reveal 
that, all other things being equal, the association between the two welfare measures and 
social trust is negative, i.e. it has the ‘wrong’ sign if Rothstein’s theory were right. Both 
estimates are insignificant although that of workers’ remittances is not far from 
significance.
16 Hence, the notion of the beneficial effects of the welfare state can safely 
be rejected, at least as far as standard indicators can inform about them. These results 
seem to leave little room for public policy. However, two further ways of influencing 
social trust remain to be explored: indirect effects and factors influencing whether or not 




Although the results in Table 3 reject that policy variables have any direct effects on 
social trust, possibility exists that they may affect the degree of social fractionalization in 
the form of income inequality and political diversity as implied by Uslaner (2004b). As 
such, public policy could have indirect effects on trust, a possibility that is explored in 
Table 4 below that regresses the two measures on a set of policy variables.
17 Beginning 
with income inequality, the table first of all shows the well-known Kuznets curve as 
economic development (the log to GDP per capita) shows a relation with inequality 
shaped as an inverted U. It also supports the notion that postcommunist countries have 
more equal income distributions although the shortcomings of the income statistics in 
these countries should be kept in mind (e.g. Henderson et al., 2005). Turning the 
attention to the policy variables, popular beliefs are supported as political ideology 
(distributed from left to right) is significantly associated with inequality, i.e. countries in 
which voters tend to vote for the right wing have more skewed income distributions. 
Finally, democracies have substantially less income inequality, a finding that opens up 
for potential effects of public policy: going from no political rights (democracy=7) to 
full rights (1) entails a 7-point drop in the Gini coefficient, which in turn would lower 
social trust by approximately 3 percentage points (21% of a standard deviation). Hence, 
even if there is no evidence of any direct influence of democracy or economic freedom 
in the medium run, such institutions could have a beneficial indirect influence on trust 
through lowering the degree of social fractionalization. On the other hand, there are no 
significant effects of political competition or the much-advertised effects of 
globalization (openness), leaving democratization as the only viable policy option 
through this channel.  
Next, the determinants of political diversity show that economic development also 
seems responsible for a decline in this dimension of fractionalization. Although 
democracy is negatively associated with diversity in the OLS regressions this effect 
proves not to be robust, and neither are any effects of political competition or openness. 
On the other hand, political ideology is negatively associated with the degree of political 
fractionalization; hence rightwing countries tend to be politically more homogenous. An 
                                                 
16 An instrumented estimate actually makes the coefficient significant at p<.10 with a negative sign. 
However, the instruments (the log to GDP per capita and the log to population size) just fail to meet the 
standard test of having at least an F-statistic of ten (F=9.18; pseudo R square=.267). There is thus no need 
to put any real faith in the estimate as it might well be overly influenced by weak instruments. 
17 A number of other variables were, naturally, included in the analysis. These variables are not reported 
here as they proved never to be significant. This, for example, includes ethnic diversity, which Glaeser 
(2006) argues is important for income inequality. 
  17interesting final implication of these results is thus that political ideology is not 
associated with social trust as a calculation of the total indirect effect through both 
income inequality and political diversity yields a small, insignificant positive effect. A 
shift in ideology thus only induces a shift in the structure of social fractionalization, not 
the overall extent. 
 
Table 4. Determinants of inequality and political diversity 
  Income inequality  Political diversity 






















































Observations 74 74 66 66 
Pseudo R squared   .800  -  .688  - 
F-statistic  34.87 24.16 13.26 13.70 
RMSE  4.858 - 1.085 - 
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** (**) [*] denotes significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. All 
regressions include regional dummies. 
 
Finally, it is worth pointing out an often neglected problem in economics, namely that of 
parameter heterogeneity. As noted above, ethnic diversity is in general not significant 
although it becomes highly so when using the robust regression technique in the full 
sample. Taking a closer look at the raw data, the problem is also clear as most ethnically 
diverse countries seem less trusting while a few quite obviously have been able to cope 
with diversity. For example, New Zealand scores .39 on the ethnic diversity index - 
meaning that there is a 39% chance that two randomly matched citizens will not share 
the same ethnic background – although the trust score at 49% is much higher than the 
global average. Consequently, future research should probably look further into the 
conditions under which ethnic diversity is detrimental to trust. Table 6 in the concluding 
section does so – in a very preliminary manner- by splitting the sample in countries 
characterized by a high/low degree of political competition and a high/low investment 
price level relative to the general price level, based on the presumption that the trust 
effects of ethnic diversity could arguably be related to either the political repercussions 
of large-scale immigration – the degree to which it can become a salient issue – and 
economic integration into society – i.e. a civilizing effect of trade. Hence, countries 
could be vulnerable to immigration from third world countries to the degree that they are 
able to cope with such immigration in both economic and political terms. Along with the 
set of indirect effects working through social fractionalization along income and political 
lines, there could therefore be some scope for public policy even when no direct effects 
can be identified. The final section summarizes the findings and discusses these policy 
implications.  
  18 
SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper has explored the cross-country determinants of social trust. The paper began 
with a discussion of previous findings, categorizing potential determinants as either 
factors influencing the social fractionalization of society or factors affecting individuals’ 
trust radii within those societies. Estimating the determinants of social trust in a sample 
of 81 countries for which a full set of credible data is available – a substantially larger 
sample than used in previous studies – showed that the strongest determinants are those 
associated with fractionalization, and in particular income inequality and political 
diversity. The results furthermore showed that countries with large Muslim populations 
are less trusting than other comparable countries and gave some support for the notion 
that countries with large populations belonging to Eastern religions (Buddhism and 
Hinduism) are more trusting. The positive effects of Protestantism that previous studies 
have identified, on the other hand, are most likely to be due to positive effects specific to 
the Nordic countries that potentially might be traced back to particular Viking norms. 
The results also indicate that monarchies have more trusting populations while the 
effects of having a communist past identified in previous studies seem to be less 
precisely identified in more recent data, indicating that some of these countries may be 
recovering from the morally detrimental effects of communism. To gain an impression 
of the size of the various determinants, Table 6 provides estimates of the relative 
influence of the factors. 
 
Table 6. Effect evaluation 
  Effect on trust of one standard deviation shock 
Shock to  OLS  Robust  No outliers 




































  Below median  Effects of ethnic diversity  










  Above median      










Note: numbers in parenthesis are percentages of a standard deviation. The effects of ethnic diversity above 
and below the median price distortion and political competition are not calculated without outliers due to 
the particularly small sample sizes. 
 
On the other hand, the paper also includes a number of negative findings. Although 
previous studies have suggested that the rule of law, education, democracy, and welfare 
  19state institutions affect social trust, the influence of such policy variables that 
theoretically would all be associated with an increase in individuals’ trust radii could not 
be confirmed. As immediate policy variables seem to have very little influence on social 
trust, it may therefore be most reasonable to understand trust and trustworthiness defined 
by individuals’ trust radii as an institution that, in a Hayekian sense, has evolved 
spontaneously. Social fractionalization tends to be rather stable in the long run with the 
important exception of large-scale immigration from dissimilar countries. As such, this 
leaves very little room for public policy except efforts to assimilate immigrants into the 
moral fabric of society. Yet, while the effects of income inequality and political diversity 
are precisely identified, the results showed that this third type of social fractionalization 
– ethnic diversity – must be recognized as a measure of latent conflict, which is likely to 
be realized only when certain conditions are satisfied. Two such conditions can be hinted 
at as shown in the lower half of Table 6: ethnic diversity tends to lead to lower social 
trust in societies characterized by a high degree of political competition and a low 
investment price level relative to the general price level.
18 In societies characterized by 
the opposite, ethnic diversity is not associated with social trust, a difference that gives 
rise to policy implications.  
The degree of political competition is determined by historical tradition and by the 
percentage of the total vote required for parties to enter parliament, indicating that 
systems with only few leading parties are better suited to resist the pressure of ethnic 
issues in the political system that could realize conflicts and increased perceived 
fractionalization. Conversely, the Scandinavian countries that have for decades had 
highly competitive political systems are probably much more vulnerable to such 
pressures. In such systems, the hard competition for voters will make otherwise 
peripheral issues such as ethnic special interests increasingly salient in efforts to gain 
extra voters, which could make people more aware of ethnic differences as well as 
making these differences more divisive. While historical tradition can understandably 
not be changed, the vote requirements to gain entry into parliament are a matter of 
constitutional design that could be changed in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, 
low investment prices for a given price level of final goods must logically reflect a low 
demand for investment goods that can be influenced in the short to medium run. 
Although one can only speculate as to the causes of the lack of investment demand, part 
of it is quite likely to be an outcome of business regulations or other institutional 
deficiencies within the immediate control of politicians. Consequently, the policy 
implication must be that countries should focus on good institutions and conservative 
economic policy in order to avoid this situation. 
Hence, what is interesting from a policy perspective is the effect of ethnic 
diversity, not the more obvious types of policy variables suggested in the literature. With 
a considerable immigration from third world countries, Western Europe and North 
America face an inflow of people that ideally ought to be economically, socially as well 
as morally integrated into society. The results show that if the bulk of the individuals 
that form this immigration wave are to be morally integrated into modern high-trust 
societies, public policy should probably be directed towards easing the barriers to 
                                                 
18 An easy way to look for such conditions consists in two steps: 1) calculate the DFBEta associated with 
the variable in question – which here is ethnic diversity; and 2) explore whether this scores, which will 
necessarily reflect any potential parameter heterogeneity of the variable, are systematically associated with 
other factors. This is the approach that yielded the two conditions emphasized here. Further details on the 
analysis are available from the author. 
  20investments and thus labour market integration. In poor countries, on the other hand, 
democratization is likely to have an influence on the formation of social trust as it will 
probably bring about a reduction in social fractionalization. 
As a final remark, it is worth considering that the policy implications of previous 
studies have all centred on increasing individuals’ trust radius by strengthening the rule 
of law, increasing education or setting up welfare systems. None of the findings in this 
paper suggest that this is possible, as all significant cross-country determinants are more 
likely associated with social fractionalization. In other words, it seems a prudent advice 
that politicians interested in affecting this factor of society should realize that one cannot 
change people’s fundamental behavioural patterns but only the context in which they 
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Table A1. Countries and social trust data 
Country Trust  Country  Trust 
Albania 25.7  Jordan  27.7 
Algeria 11.2  Latvia  20.3 
Argentina 20.8  Lithuania  25.9 
Armenia 24.7  Luxembourg  25.9 
Australia 43.8  Macedonia  10.9 
Austria 32.8  Malaysia  10.3
D 
Azerbaijan 20.5  Malta  20.7 
Bangladesh 22.2  Mexico  25.1 
Belarus 30.5  Moldova  18.4 
Belgium 31.4  Morocco  23.5 
Bolivia 17
L  Netherlands 53.9 
Brazil 4.8  New  Zealand  49.0 
Bulgaria 28.6  Nicaragua  20
L 
Canada 46.9  Nigeria  22.7 
Chile 22.5  Norway  63.9 
China 54.6  Pakistan  25.7 
Colombia 10.8  Panama  25
L 
Costa Rica  7.4
D  Paraguay 23
L 
Croatia 21.0  Peru  7.8 
Czech Republic  27.5  Philippines  6.9 
Denmark 60.1  Poland  23.7 
Dominican Republic  26.4  Portugal  15.7 
Ecuador 8.9
D  Romania 14.9 
Egypt 37.9  Russia  28.4 
El Salvador  14.6
D  Singapore 16.9 
Estonia 23.9  Slovakia  21.9 
Finland 56.4  Slovenia  18.2 
France 23.3  South  Africa  22.2 
Georgia 18.7  South  Korea  32.5 
Germany 36.1  Spain  33.6 
Ghana 22.4  Sweden  62.3 
Greece 23.7  Switzerland  42.1 
Guatemala 28
L  Taiwan 38.2 
Honduras 25
L  Tanzania 8.1 
Hong Kong  26.8
D  Thailand 38.9
D 
Hungary 25.9  Turkey  10.4 
Iceland 41.5  Uganda  7.6 
India 38.3  Ukraine  29.1 
Indonesia 51.6  United  Kingdom  36.9 
Iran 65.4  Uruguay  22.1 
Ireland 41.2  USA  42.1 
Israel 23.5  Venezuela  14.8 
Italy 31.4  Vietnam  41.3 
Japan 42.9  Zimbabwe  11.9 
Note: observations marked 
L derive from the 1995 Latinobarometro; observations marked 
D derive from 
the 2003-2004 Danish social capital project. All other data are averages of all available observations in the 
World Values Survey. 
 
 